(ProsperNews.net) – A Navy Aegis cruiser nearly shot down our own F/A‑18s over the Red Sea, and the official reports say it all came down to training, leadership, and preventable failure.
Story Snapshot
- USS Gettysburg fired missiles at friendly F/A‑18F Super Hornets mistakenly classified as Houthi anti‑ship missiles during a chaotic December 2024 night in the Red Sea.
- Navy investigations found systemic failures in training, watchstanding, identification procedures, and risk management across the Harry S. Truman strike group.
- The Gettysburg incident was one of four preventable mishaps on the deployment, with losses and damage totaling about $164 million.
- Reports warn the near‑fratricide could have been “catastrophic,” exposing how years of DEI and bureaucracy weakened real war‑fighting standards.
How a Front‑Line Cruiser Nearly Killed American Pilots
On the night of December 22, 2024, the Ticonderoga‑class guided‑missile cruiser USS Gettysburg stood watch in the Red Sea as part of the USS Harry S. Truman carrier strike group, guarding U.S. sailors and vital shipping lanes from Houthi missiles and drones. In the darkness, radar operators detected fast, low‑flying tracks and, under pressure, misread them as hostile anti‑ship cruise missiles instead of what they actually were: two friendly F/A‑18F Super Hornets returning from a mission.
Following broken identification checks and missed communication cross‑checks with the carrier and air wing, Gettysburg’s combat team received authorization to fire surface‑to‑air missiles at the tracks they believed were inbound Houthi weapons. The interceptors streaked toward the supposed targets, but the jets were not hit, and no lives were lost. Navy investigators later labeled the event a near‑fratricide that came dangerously close to destroying two American fighters and their aircrews.
Investigations Expose a Pattern of Preventable Mishaps
The Gettysburg engagement was not an isolated error. Navy command investigations released in December 2025 grouped it with three other major mishaps on the same Truman deployment: a ship collision involving the carrier and the loss of three Super Hornets in separate accidents, including one swept overboard. Across all four events, the Navy calculated roughly $164 million in combined losses and damage, a staggering bill for errors senior leaders repeatedly called preventable, not unavoidable.
Investigative reports and media summaries describe a consistent theme: failures in training, leadership, watchstanding discipline, and adherence to established doctrine and procedures. Combat system employment was flawed, airspace control between the carrier and escorts broke down, and risk management standards slipped in a high‑tempo theater where Houthi missile and drone attacks were a real threat. Hardware was not the main culprit; human performance and command climate were. The Red Sea became a live‑fire test that too many officers and watch teams failed.
What Went Wrong Inside the Gettysburg’s Combat Information Center
Inside Gettysburg’s combat information center, watchstanders faced a classic fog‑of‑war scenario: multiple air tracks, real Houthi launches in the region, and a nighttime environment that forced complete reliance on sensors and electronic identification. The cruiser’s Aegis system, SPY‑1 radar, and surface‑to‑air missiles were designed to protect the carrier battle group. Yet the crew did not properly match radar tracks with known friendly flight plans, nor did they fully reconcile data with the carrier’s air operations picture before committing weapons.
Rules of engagement required both timely defense against suspected threats and positive identification to prevent friendly fire. Investigators found that crucial cross‑checks either did not occur, were rushed, or were not clearly understood among the watch team and the chain of command. The result was a shoot decision based on incomplete correlation and misclassification of friendly aircraft as enemy missiles. Reports emphasize that standard doctrine, rigorously applied, should have prevented the engagement, underscoring how training and leadership shortfalls translated directly into trigger‑pulling mistakes.
From Woke Distractions to War‑Fighting Reality
For years, many conservatives warned that a Pentagon obsessed with climate agendas, DEI quotas, and social engineering would eventually pay a price in real combat readiness. The Truman strike group’s cluster of mishaps, capped by Gettysburg firing on American jets, shows what happens when war‑fighting focus erodes. Investigators did not blame pronoun briefings, but their findings of weak standards, poor watchstanding, and inadequate risk management align with what everyday patriots have sensed: bureaucracy and ideology grew while hard skills and accountability lagged.
https://twitter.com/JSchogol73030/status/1996983423705968798
Trump’s return to the White House has already shifted emphasis back toward readiness, recruitment, and serious training, but these incidents are a reminder of the damage inherited from years of drift. Carrier aviation and surface warfare communities now face intensified training, doctrine updates, and renewed scrutiny from Congress and the public. For conservatives who value a strong defense and responsible spending, a $164 million tab for preventable mistakes is unacceptable. The men and women in uniform deserve leadership that prioritizes competence over fashionable talking points.
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